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Fishing for export: calo, recruiters, informality, and debt in international supply chains 
KATHERINE JONES, DAVID VISSER and AGNES SIMIC 
Abstract: This article represents the first study to conduct a comprehensive review of 
employment practices within the Indonesian export fishing industry, the world’s largest 
exporter of tuna products. In contrast to the Thai and Taiwanese fishing industries which 
engage primarily migrant fishers, fishers in Indonesia are Indonesian nationals, although 
many are internal migrants. We make two arguments. Firstly, that some of the same risks of 
forced labour—in hiring and employment practices—exist even where the workforce are 
domestic rather than international migrants. Secondly, our research identified that informal 
employment relations inherent in small-scale traditional fishing have been co-opted by 
businesses as a means of reducing labour costs while maximising their profits. Recruitment 
was an area of particular risk for exploitation of fishers. Our research has implications for 
companies sourcing from Indonesia as well governments of import companies. In particular, 
we argue that a narrow focus on modern slavery risks inadequate or even counterproductive 
policy responses. 
Keywords: Fishing, seafood, supply chains, Indonesia, fishers, recruitment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Seafood is big business. It is one of the most traded food commodities worldwide and 
generates more revenue than meat, tobacco, rice, and sugar combined (FAO 2016). An 
increased appetite for fish in Western food markets coupled with technological innovation 
which allows fresh catch to be transported around the globe has quadrupled trade over the 
past half century (FAO 2018). For business and for consumers seafood is a success story. 
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However, for our oceans and for the people in the low-income countries catching and 
processing fish, the costs and risks of this global industry are substantial. According to the 
United Nations, nearly 90 per cent of the world’s marine stocks are now fully exploited, over-
exploited, or completely depleted (UNCTAD 2018). For the past decade, journalists and 
human rights organisations have reported the trafficking, forced labour, and even murder of 
fishers in the Asia-Pacific (EJF 2018a, 2018b, Greenpeace 2018, McDowell et al. 2015). The 
European Union (EU), the United States, and Japan account for around two-thirds of the 
global value of seafood imports (FAO 2018: 7). Yet, our understanding of the relationship 
between conditions in fishing in the Asia-Pacific and the business practices of international 
companies in consumer markets is still limited.  
To date, empirical research in this region has primarily been conducted in Thailand (e.g. 
Vandergeest et al. 2017), or on the conditions of the estimated 250,000 Indonesian fishers 
who are recruited onto Taiwanese vessels (Greenpeace 2018). In both cases, studies have 
focussed predominantly on the trafficking and forced labour of fishers. This article 
contributes to knowledge about the working conditions of fishers in Indonesia who catch for 
export. Indonesia is the world’s second largest producer of seafood after China. Despite this, 
to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to conduct an in-depth review of 
employment practices within the Indonesia export fishing industry. In contrast to the Thai 
fishing industry, which relies on the labour of migrant fishers, fishers in Indonesia are 
Indonesian nationals, although many are internal migrants. We make two unique 
contributions to the literature. Firstly, we challenge the assumption in the literature that 
labour risks in fishing arise out of fishers’ migrant status. We argue that some of the same 
risks of forced labour—in hiring and employment practices—exist even where the workforce 
are domestic rather than international migrants. Secondly, our research identified that 
informal employment relations inherent in small-scale traditional fishing have been co-opted 
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by businesses as a means of reducing labour costs while maximising their profits (Duong 
2018, Tickler et al. 2018). Overall, we found that labour conditions in Indonesia’s export 
seafood industry are generally poor. Fishers receive little remuneration for ‘dirty, demanding, 
and dangerous’ labour and many are in perpetual cycles of debt.  
The findings in this qualitative study have been collected and analysed by Coventry 
University in partnership with the Centre for Sustainable Ocean Policy at University of 
Indonesia and IOM (International Organization for Migration) Indonesia.1 In total, five field-
sites in Indonesia, all playing a widely recognised and substantial role in the seafood export 
industry, were selected by the project team. These were Benoa (located on the island of Bali), 
Bitung (North Sulawesi), Mauru Baru (Jakarta, Java island), Ambon (Maluku, Eastern 
Indonesia), and Tegal (Central Java). Bahasa Indonesia-speaking research staff conducted 
142 interviews: 50 fishers, 25 canning factory workers, 27 stakeholders (government 
officials, non-governmental organisation (NGO) and fishermen’s association representatives), 
10 recruiters, and 30 company representatives. The majority of the interviews were digitally 
recorded with consent and then translated and transcribed. The interviews that were not 
digitally recorded instead relied on extensive handwritten notes. Thematic analysis was 
carried out to best capture the themes and issues being raised and the relative importance of 
these concerns from across the sample.  
LABOUR CONDITIONS IN FISHING FOR EXPORT 
To date the vast majority of empirical data on labour conditions within the exporting seafood 
industry in the Asia-Pacific has been collected within the Greater Mekong region (EJF 2018a, 
2018b, Human Rights Watch 2018, IOM 2016; Issara Institute & IJM 2017, UNODC 2017). 
                                                          
1 The findings reported in this paper are part of a larger study conducted with the Issara Institute, which has 
collated evidence of good practice, including by responsible sourcing teams in international retailers, buyers, 
and exporters, and within Indonesian suppliers and vessel owners. 
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The focus of this research, much of which originates via human rights reports, concerns itself 
with identifying the victims of trafficking and forced labour, their experiences, and, in a few 
instances, their abusers (Bélanger 2014, Derks 2010, Marschke & Vandergeest 2016, 
Vandergeest et al. 2017). Most of this literature explores the situation of migrant fishers. 
Major indicators of trafficking and forced labour include debt-bondage, violence at sea, 
deception, forced confinement, and even murder (EJF 2018b, Issara Institute & IJM 2017). 
Fee-charging intermediaries who are utilised to recruit migrant fishers from one country into 
employment in another are highly implicated in generating these conditions. Exploitation 
arises because migrants are dependent on their recruiter for knowledge, identity and work 
permit documents, and for employment contracts. Fishers usually pay a fee to the recruiter, 
which often leads them into debt-bondage, a key indicator of forced labour (Jones et al. 
2017). A recent, large-scale survey of the prevalence of human trafficking in the Thai fishing 
industry found that three quarters of fishers sampled were bonded to vessel captains or the 
vessel-owning companies by debt incurred through high recruitment fees (Issaara Institute & 
IJM 2017).  
The studies find that, in general, working conditions for migrants on board vessels are poor. 
Fishing is highly labour intensive, as fishers typically have to work for twenty hours a day, 
every day of the week whilst at sea (Vandergeest et al. 2017). Fishing is a dangerous 
occupation, and fishers often have to take risks in operating hazardous machinery in stormy 
weather (Derks 2010, Issara Institute & IJM 2017). Vessels often lack proper sleeping 
quarters, or even mattresses and blankets (Robertson 2011, Stringer et al. 2011). Personal 
hygiene is often an issue, as fishers may be required to wash in salt water and vessels may 
lack toilet facilities (Devlin 2009, Issara Institute & IJM 2017, Stringer et al. 2011). Fresh 
water for drinking is typically scarce, especially when vessels have been at sea for prolonged 
periods of time (Stringer et al. 2011, Surtees 2008). Unsurprisingly, diseases caused by 
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vitamin deficiency arising out of poor-quality and insufficient food are common (Devlin 
2009, Stringer et al. 2011).  
Within the literature, human trafficking and forced labour on vessels are largely attributed to 
insufficient inspection, policing, monitoring, and regulation of the fishing industry (IOM 
2016). According to this argument, the vulnerability of crews to abuses increases the deeper 
at sea the vessel fishes, as it is more difficult for the authorities to maintain oversight of 
working conditions (de Coning 2011, EJF 2015, Robertson 2011). Without oversight by 
authorities, fishers find it difficult to report abuse and to seek assistance, while at the same 
time, labour organising and membership of trade unions remain rare (Robertson 2011). For 
some, it is criminals and unscrupulous actors who are responsible for trafficking (Chapsos & 
Hamilton 2018). In this analysis, exploitation is an aberration rather than arising out of 
prevailing market conditions or systemic unfairness (Fudge 2017), which can be tackled with 
better implementation of labour laws or more responsible sourcing practices by companies.  
A more sophisticated and persuasive analysis situates the exploitation of fishers as being 
driven by an increased global demand for fish and the rapid growth of industrial fishing 
fleets, as well as the over-exploitation of several fish stocks (ILO 2013). This analysis echoes 
critiques of modern slavery which view free/unfree labour as arising out of the political 
economy of transnational capitalist modes of production (e.g. Fudge 2017, LeBaron 2015, 
Strauss & Fudge 2013). Falling productivity arising out of intensification of fishing methods 
and the consequent depletion of fish stocks induces vessel owners to cut operating costs to 
maintain or increase profits. They do this through fishing illegally, catching fish in territories 
where they are not legally allowed to do so, catching more than quotas allow, or catching 
species of fish which they are not supposed to (Agnew & Barnes 2004). It is the depletion of 
fish stocks through hyper-intensification which drives fishing vessels further out to sea and 
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for longer periods to maximise their catch. However, such long-distance fishing operations 
are labour-intensive and expensive. Crew wages can account for between a third and half of 
all operating costs (Kelleher et al. 2009). Companies seek to maximise their profitability by 
aggressively reducing expenditure on crew: for example, by non-compliance with labour and 
safety standards or by withholding pay (Tickler et al. 2018: 2). They also do this through 
hiring migrant fishers who can be persuaded to work for less than the average wage (Agnew 
& Barnes 2004, Tickler et al. 2018). Migrant workers can also be more easily controlled 
through confiscation of their ID documents, which physically prevents them from leaving 
vessels (Issara Institute & IJM 2017, Robertson 2011). Further, the recruitment process in 
which migrant labourers are sourced by agencies in one jurisdiction and employed by fishing 
operators in another, means that fishers can easily be deceived by these agencies or by fishing 
operators when embarking the fishing vessel and can be coerced into accepting employment 
contracts or agreements on lesser terms than initially discussed (EJF 2018a, Stringer et al. 
2011, Surtees 2008). In summary, the existing literature leaves a gap in knowledge about 
working conditions in the Indonesian export fishing industry where fishers are not migrants. 
This gap is addressed in this article, which now moves on to provide an overview of the 
context in Indonesia.  
DEFINED BY THE SEA: FISHING IN INDONESIA 
This article examines the working conditions of fishers catching fish in Indonesian waters for 
export to US and European markets. When compared to the literature reviewed above, in 
particular that which reports conditions in Thailand, there is one substantial difference: 
Indonesia’s fishing vessels are crewed almost wholly by Indonesian nationals rather than by 
migrants. In 2015, an Associated Press investigation directed the world’s attention to the 
Indonesian islands of Benjina and Ambon where 1,300 fishermen from Cambodia, Myanmar, 
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Laos, and Thailand were rescued from Thai fishing vessels grounded as a result of a 
moratorium imposed on ‘foreign’ fishing vessels by the Indonesian government (McDowell 
et al. 2015). Engaged in catching fish which ended up on the shelves of well-known 
supermarkets, the fishermen had, in some cases, endured years of violence and abuse at the 
hands of the vessel captains and owners (IOM 2016, McDowell et al. 2015). Partly as a result 
of the ensuing international media attention, the Indonesian government amplified 
implementation of a ban on illegal fishing and took action against the use of (ex-)foreign 
fishing vessels in its waters. Acting on requests from the government, since then the 
Indonesian navy has impounded and blown up over 400 foreign vessels (owned by Thailand, 
Taiwan, and China) (Hutton 2017). Subsequently, international migrant fishers are no longer 
evident in the Indonesian fishing industry which produces for export. Many are, however, 
internal migrants. The majority of Indonesian fishers originate from the north coast of the 
island of Java, which has a reputation for being both a region of fishing as well as 
‘producing’ fishermen who work elsewhere in Indonesia and overseas on foreign vessels. 
Indonesia is defined by the sea. As an archipelago with over 17,000 islands and a coastline of 
55,000 kilometres, two thirds of the Indonesian population live in coastal areas, with two 
thirds of these working in the fishing industries. Indonesia is the second largest producer of 
marine fisheries in the world, after China. It accounts for almost half of all seafood 
production within the South East Asia region (FAO 2018). However, quite remarkably, 
almost 95 per cent of all fish is caught and produced for the domestic market, with only 5 per 
cent going for export (Packard Foundation 2018). This 5 per cent is, nevertheless, substantial, 
with exports amounting to US$2.3 billion for the first six months of 2018, and tuna—its most 
valuable export—quadrupling in value between 2000 and 2016, to US$569 million per 
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annum.2 The United States is the primary destination of exports (30 per cent), followed by 
Japan (23 per cent) and Europe (13%) (Seafood Trade Intelligence Portal n.d.). The United 
Kingdom is a relatively low importer of Indonesian seafood products (HMRC 2017 referred 
to in Seafish, 2017).  
Historically, Indonesia has been the subject of substantial illegal fishing, primarily by Thai, 
Taiwanese, and Chinese industrial-sized trawlers, which landed their catch in their own ports 
denying Indonesia any value from the fish (Sunoko & Huang 2014). As well as impacting on 
Indonesia’s economy, overfishing, mostly by the trawlers—but also resulting from non-
sustainable forms of fishing in general—has led to a dramatic decline in overall fish stocks 
and the disappearance of some species altogether from Indonesian waters (Packard 
Foundation 2018). This means that fishing is no longer a sustainable occupation in Indonesia, 
with many traditional fishers living below the poverty line (Prima et al. 2015). In 2014, in an 
attempt to redress this situation, President Joko Widodo launched his ambition to transform 
Indonesia into the world’s leading maritime power at his Inauguration. As one of his first 
acts, he appointed the charismatic Susi Pudiiastuti as Minister of Marine Affairs. ‘Bu Susi’, 
as she is affectionately known at home and abroad, promptly set highly ambitious new export 
production growth targets of up to 80 per cent for the industry. To try to achieve this, she 
opened up foreign investment into the industry and advocated for the reduction of 
international import tariffs for Indonesian seafood products to the same level as those enjoyed 
by Indonesia’s competitor seafood-producing countries (e.g. Vietnam). In December 2018, 
Indonesia concluded a free trade agreement for seafood with the countries of EFTA (the 
European Free Trade Association) (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Lichtenstein), with a 
                                                          
2 https://www.tridge.com/intelligences/tuna/ID  
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similar agreement with the European Union expected to follow. This indicates both the scale 
of Indonesia’s global seafood ambitions as well the timeliness of this research.  
Globally, one of the key challenges for enhancing the labour rights of fishers is their lack of 
recognition as salaried employees (ILO 2016). This challenge arises out of the construction 
and representation of fishing as a ‘traditional’, small-scale, occupation in which families and 
wider kin support themselves in the global economy. In traditional fishing, fishers receive a 
share of the profits from the sale of the catch rather than a salary. For this reason, for decades, 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) has debated the definition of ‘fishers’ as 
informal self-employed versus employees (ILO 2018). ILO Convention C188 Work in 
Fishing, 2007 (ILO 2007) grapples with this through setting labour standards regarding safety 
and hygiene on board vessels, hours of rest, (non-)hiring of child labour, and the use of 
signed work agreements regardless of fishers’ status. In 2016, as part of moves to ratify 
C188, Indonesia introduced a series of laws aimed at professionalising the employment of 
fishers, including the adoption of a minimum daily wage for fishers crewing vessels larger 
than 30 gross tonnage. At the time of writing, the daily wage is set at 60,000 IDR (US$4.20) 
payable only for the time fishers spent on board the vessel catching fish. According to the 
law, wages can be supplemented by a ‘premi’ (bonus) resulting from a share of the profits of 
the sale of the catch. We now move on to consider the empirical data and its analysis. 
‘SOMEONE I KNEW CAME TO MY VILLAGE’: 
HIRING FISHERS IN THE INDONESIA DOMESTIC INDUSTRY 
In Indonesia, the domestic fishing crews are recruited in three main ways: kinship networks, 
‘walk-up’ labour, and intermediaries, known as calo. Firstly, where possible, vessel captains 
recruit their crew from among their friends, extended kin, and neighbours. As noted above, 
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many of the fishers in Indonesia working in the domestic industry come from north central 
Java. This means that the informal networks which underpin recruitment are highly 
embedded in these communities. This is also the traditional way for captains to find crews for 
their boats in small-scale sustainable fishing.  
Oh, I already knew the captain. He is from the same village as I am. After being there 
for a while and getting to know more people, I went home for a bit—but as soon as I 
arrived he called me again and I went back. It tends to happen like this there—I’ve 
already worked on ten boats, but for different companies.  
fisher interviewed in Bitung (November 2018) 
Secondly, vessel captains operating out of the large ports of Mauru Baru and Bitung recruit 
their crews from among the men who hang around port areas seeking work. This tends to be 
men who have disembarked from voyages as well as fishers who live locally and who will 
literally ‘walk-up’ to vessels seeking their next job. Again, this is a traditional way for 
captains to find crews.  
We ask around whether the ship is lacking ABK [fishing crew]. We also ask about 
when the ship is sailing. We will then meet the second person who is going to 
introduce us to the captain. We'll just ask the captain. If there's a vacancy, we'll go on 
board, if not, we'll find another ship. 
fisher interviewed in Ambon (November 2018) 
Thirdly, intermediaries known as ‘calo’ recruit crews on behalf of captains and fishing 
companies. Captains and vessel-owning companies utilise calo where they are unable to find 
sufficient crew members, largely where there is no available local labour force. We found 
that calo were in use in Benoa, Ambon, Bitung, and Maura Baru. Like the captains, calo find 
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crews from among their own extended social networks and visit the villages and 
neighbourhoods (‘kampungs’) in coastal communities which are known for fishing. These 
include Tegal, Sumatra, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Nusa Tenggara. They also operate in 
port areas referring the walk-up crews to available vessels. For brokering the employment, 
calo may charge a fee to the captain, the company, or to the recruit. While some may have 
other jobs, supplementing their income through recruitment, others do this full-time. Calo are 
similar to those who are known as brokers, dalals, sponsors (Jones et al. 2017, Lindquist 
2010) in other places and in other economic sectors, and operate in the informal economy. In 
Benoa and Ambon, interviewed fishers highlighted the propensity for local ‘gangsters’ 
known as ‘preman’ to also be involved in this work.  
We bring them by a plane. Once found and gathered a number of the crew that we 
need, we would buy them a ticket ... they’re mostly from Java. Sometimes we got 
crews from there, but when we got them from there we would buy them a flight ticket 
from Java to Bali. … Then to Ambon, transit in Makassar. My friend from Java 
organises this all for a fee of 100 [IDR] per crew.  
vessel captain operating out of Ambon and Benoa (interviewed November 2018) 
As in Thailand and elsewhere (Vandergeest et al. 2017), interviewees for this study had 
experienced exploitation at the hands of the intermediaries which they had not experienced 
when recruited onto vessels through kinship networks or walk-ups. Most frequently 
mentioned was through the fees charged by calo to fishers, of up to 2 or 3 million IDR 
(approximately US$150 to US$200), ostensibly to cover transport costs. While occasionally 
crews are flown to Bali, most often transportation is arranged by van and ferry. However, 
crews do not pay this up-front, as individuals in fishing communities such as Tegal do not 
have access to this level of money. The fee is typically structured as a ‘cash advance’ (known 
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as a ‘kas bon’) which is paid to crews as a down payment before they depart. Calo use the 
offer of a kas bon to entice potential crew to leave with them. It is through the kas bon, which 
becomes a form of personal debt that exploitation occurs.  
My family and all my neighbours are fishermen. We come from the ‘Fishermen 
Kampung’. ... Someone I knew came to my village and told me they could give me 
money. I was told that I would get 3 million rupiah [US$200] to go to Benoa. I took a 
bus from my village to Benoa. This took four days. I worked on a longline ship with 
people from my village. 
fisher interviewed in Benoa (August 2018) 
The kas bon money, which comes from the vessel owning companies, is used to buy food and 
other household supplies to maintain families while fishers are at sea. Rather than something 
which is specific to calo, however, kas bon is a common practice throughout the traditional 
fishing industry in Indonesia, regardless of whether intermediaries are involved or not. 
Traditionally, the kas bon functions as an informal system of credit which supports fishers 
and their families while they are at sea. Advances are deducted from the fishers’ earnings at 
the end of the voyage:  
Kas bon is to borrow some money. Well sometimes 400,000 IDR [US$28], sometimes 
1,000,000 IDR [US$70]. It depends on the needs in the house.  
fisher, interviewed in Tegal (August 2018)  
In this case however, the kas bon is not primarily utilised to help fishers. Calo utilise the 
opportunity to extort money from fishers before and after the voyage. Interviewees related 
examples—of their own as well as of others—where calo persuade recruits to leave home 
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with promises of large cash advances which are not then handed over. Calo commonly retain 
the bulk of money from the company for themselves.  
Yes, and there are a lot of middlemen in the port, middlemen for ABK [fishers]. Well 
they will persuade the candidates, I don't know what they say exactly but they will say 
sugar-coated stuffs. … Like yesterday, I have a friend from one ship, he was sent by a 
middleman. He only got 500,000 IDR [US$35] from the actual amount of 3 million 
[US$210] [of kas bon from the company]. So how much did the middleman get? 2.5 
million [US$175] cash advance. Cash advance for the calo!  
fisher interviewed in Tegal (August 2018) 
Calo interviewed for this project confirmed that, while crews typically only receive a small 
amount of kas bon—for example, three to four million IDR (US$210–280)—companies 
actually forward ten million IDR (US$700) to them (the calo) for each fisher recruited. 
Between six and seven million IDR is retained by calo as their fee while the full advance of 
ten million IDR (US$700) is deducted from the fisher’s salary at the end of the voyage.  
As well as extracting a portion of money from the kas bon, calo also find ways to extort 
additional money from crews. This research found that calo in Benoa organise temporary 
accommodation (known as ‘the mess’) for fishers who arrive in Bali but have a few days or 
weeks to wait until their ship departs. High rents are deducted from the portion of the kas bon 
which is given to fishers. Calo also encourage recruits to buy food and alcohol and to access 
sex workers, the cost of which is also deducted from the kas bon. In Benoa, researchers saw it 
was clear that the calo had interests in the local shops, restaurants, and sex work industry in 
the port area. As the kas bon is typically given immediately prior to fishers’ departure, they 
are not able to challenge such deductions. 
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I work for Mr. X. [interviewee names a locally known gangster] We are brothers.3 I 
often go home and help my fellow village. Just this time I was back and I am bringing 
five more people here. We receive advance of ten million [US$700] per person from 
the company. We give three to four million [US$210 to 280] to the candidate. We tell 
him he must give half to his wife back in the village. The other half he is free to spend 
here in Benoa on food and accommodation. We also help with the sex workers. 
Drinks. Whatever he needs he can have. We help with this. I rent a house. There is a 
room there. They stay there until there is a ship. We negotiate the ships. Could be one 
day or two months, depends till we find a ship.  
calo working in Benoa (interviewed June 2018) 
Prior research on intermediaries which broker employment in commercial fishing as well as 
in other sectors identifies high recruitment fees as an important way in which recruits are 
extorted money they are owed (Jones et al. 2017). As workers get into debt to pay the fee, 
their employment becomes bonded, as workers are unable to leave until they repay the money 
advanced, often leaving little or no earnings at the end of the employment. The literature 
associates the risk of entering this form of debt-bondage with the vulnerabilities of being an 
(international) migrant worker (Issara Institute & IJM 2017). Yet this research has found that 
intermediaries—in this case, calo—function as extorters even where the migration takes place 
within the recruit’s own country.  
Moreover, as has been found in research on international recruitment in other sectors (Jones 
2014), calo in Indonesia do not just extort fishermen monetarily, they also function as a 
guarantee or ‘bond’ to captains and fishing companies that the crew will remain with the 
                                                          
3 In this context, the Indonesian word used refers to someone who may literally be a kin relationship, but more 
likely a close contact who is a ‘fictive kin’.  
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vessel. For companies, advancing a cash kas bon has the risk that the recipient will decide to 
leave with the money and abandon the voyage, leaving them out of pocket. For companies, 
advancing the kas bon through the calo passes to them the responsibility that they will ensure 
that the fisher gets—and stays—on the vessel until he has earned sufficient to repay the 
advance. In effect, calo indirectly and directly, function as labour ‘enforcers’. It is for this 
reason, calo argue, they retain the six million IDR from the company kas bon:  
[The other 6 million rupiah, 419 US$] is our guarantee. We guarantee them. If they 
run away the companies make us pay. They lose money. It is us that bear the debt. 
And the burden. So we keep that until they finish their contract. 
calo interviewed in Benoa port (June 2018) 
This research also found that in Benoa the role of the calo does not end with brokering 
recruitment or arranging the kas bon prior to departure. In fact, they are often responsible for 
disbursing payment of their recruits’ wages at the end of the voyage. This enables them to 
take charge of all the money flowing to the crew, from the kas bon which is advanced to the 
crew, to the deductions which are made from crew from their salary. According to 
interviewed fishers, calo also try to extract more money at this point. There are extra charges 
applied without any credible evidence they have been made, and fishers may even be forced 
to buy their tickets back home through the calo at inflated costs: 
After a trip, we usually get our pay. The frustrating thing is we usually get pulled 
aside by the preman [calo], who are waiting for us in their cars, and strongly 
encourage us to go spend our money at their shops. They make us buy our tickets 
home through them too. 
fisher interviewed Benoa port (August 2018)  
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Interviewees reported that at times, calo took all of their recruits’ wages through such 
deductions, leaving fishers with no money at the end of a voyage. This can be used to force 
fishers to get back onto the vessel for a further voyage rather than go home. It can be, in this 
sense, a continuous cycle:  
I often worked thirty hours and then sleep. It was very hard. We had to pay for our 
food. For three months. When I wanted to go home for Lebaran [Eid], I left but I did 
not receive any money. My captain told me that he had paid my wages to the calo. But 
the calo threatened me and told me that I had spent all my wages. They have agreed 
to pay me if I go back again. But for now I have no money. 
fisher interviewed Benoa port (August 2018) 
As has been found with other research on recruiters in other sectors, calo are deeply 
embedded in pre-existing social relations within communities rather than a separate 
‘industry’ (Fernandez 2013). Their function here, though, is less about helping kin and 
neighbours to find work but to supply a continuous stream of low-cost workers to vessel 
owners. Principally, the calo are used to locate and arrange transportation for fishers who live 
elsewhere where there are insufficient crew locally. Their function as intermediaries is to 
connect employers (vessel owners and captains) with workers (fishers) in situations where 
they would otherwise find it difficult to find them (Jones 2014). Their role is also to supply a 
particular type of labour: men who are willing—or who are coerced into—working into a job 
which is dangerous, dirty and for which they earn little money.  
‘THERE ARE MANY ABK FISHERS EXPLOITED’: 
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN EXPORT FISHING IN INDONESIA 
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Few of the fishers interviewed for the current study had received a written work agreement 
(known as the ‘PKL’ in Indonesia), despite this being a requirement according to Indonesian 
law. As elsewhere in the commercial fishing sector, working relationships are kept informal 
and reliant on the direction of the captain. Verbal agreements constitute a brief discussion 
with the captain about the expected length of the trip, what species they are intending to 
catch, and how the crew will be paid:  
They don’t have fair contract system between the workers and the owner. The 
contract system is only a verbal contract:‘If you want to work on my vessel, please 
come on.’ It’s only like that. 
fisher interviewed in Tegal (June 2018) 
Consequently, interviewees experienced highly variable working conditions on vessels, 
depending on how large the vessel was, how long it remained at sea, what species of fish they 
were catching (and therefore how intensive the fishing was), and what company owned the 
vessel. While fishing was acknowledged to be an occupation which rarely involves standard 
hours because of the nature of the industry, interviewees reported that working hours were 
largely dependent on the captain or the company’s established working practices: 
The working condition can be inhumane. We can work for twenty-four hours a day 
sometimes. Sometimes we have to work at night with no rest. When all is set, we get a 
break, sometimes only four hours a day. 
fisher, interviewed Tegal (June 2018) 
According to interviewees, small areas on the boat, often shared with the kitchen facilities, 
are sometimes allocated for rest but fishers prefer to sleep outdoors because the inside spaces 
are too cramped: 
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Another issue is the sleeping space/room, which is too small for twenty to twenty-five 
people, and thereby sometimes we can only sleep while sitting because there is not 
enough proper place. 
fisher interviewed Tegal (November 2018) 
Fishers are not allowed to eat the seafood catch, which is intended for sale, with two meals of 
rice per day commonly allowed. In addition, crews typically have access to packets of instant 
noodles for snacks with the costs of these deducted from their salaries. While better than 
many situations reported by studies of the Thai industry, fishers interviewed did report 
running out of food when the vessels had been at sea for long periods of time or when 
insufficient supplies had been purchased by the captain:  
Sometimes we weren’t given enough food. We only provided drink but no food. If the 
boat had run out of food, then we just let it go. We may only cook the basic food 
because there is no snack. We have water, fresh water, but we bring it ourselves. We 
sometimes use melted ice block for drinking water. Sometimes the captain wasn’t 
really caring about the crews. He never gives us food and he eat everything himself.  
fisher interviewed Tegal, (November 2018) 
That said, interviewees who had crewed squid boats, which are often at sea for ten months at 
a time, noted the working conditions to be especially challenging. In part, fishers associated 
this with the greater length of time at sea on such squid boats (up to ten months) and the type 
of fishing involved, which necessitates working through the night. Beri beri, a vitamin 
deficiency disease similar to scurvy and which has commonly been found in migrant crews 
on Thai, Taiwanese, and Chinese vessels, was also frequently discussed by Indonesian fishers 
who had crewed squid boats: 
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Squid fishing also makes us get sick quite easily. People regularly get very swollen 
feet and beri beri. They are quite itchy, because they aren’t given deck shoes and 
regularly get exposure to saltwater. 
fisher interviewed Tegal (June 2018) 
Studies on the Thai industry have found violence on vessels to be common. For instance, one 
report found that one in five fishers experience violence (Issara Institute & IJM 2017). In 
comparison, examples of physical violence on board Indonesian vessels were infrequently 
shared by interviewees, with the exception of some isolated incidences. Such incidents appear 
to be associated with specific captains with reputations for violence, rather than structural or 
endemic throughout the industry in Indonesia. Violence in the form of punishment was 
usually associated with incidences where the valuable catch had been damaged:  
There is a form of ‘code’ on board, with certain punishments. For example, if I make 
a mistake, during the rest time between sets of one to two hours I won’t be allowed to 
rest. Notes are kept on this, so when our friends are sleeping we will be forced to stay 
awake. … Say we toss the mainline and damage or lose it—that’ll be counted. Or, we 
hook the fish in the wrong way, don’t follow orders immediately—that also gets 
punished. …. We use a gaff hook to lift them on board. We are meant to get them in 
the head so we don’t damage the flesh. If we get the body of the fish, we get a 
punishment. 
fisher interviewed Tegal (June 2018) 
Crews demonstrated little awareness of their legal rights, accepting poor conditions as simply 
part of their lot in life as poor men who became fishers. Even where interviewees were aware 
of laws intended to protect them, which wasn’t often, the informality within the system meant 
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that asserting these rights was usually not possible. Fishers in Indonesia are not members of 
trade unions, with traditional unions finding it difficult in Indonesia, as elsewhere, to operate 
in the industry. Crews were acutely aware that, if they complained, they were unlikely to be 
given much payment by the captain or be able to arrange work in the future with that captain:  
I didn’t feel comfortable to complain about salary on my first year. Many of my 
colleagues have been working for five to six years on that vessel. None of them 
complained about the salary. It was also because the captain and the ‘deputy I’ and 
‘deputy II’ are relatives. Of course if we complained about the work, of course he 
would defend his brothers. It’s such a waste of energy, I thought. 
fisher, interviewed in Tegal (June 2018) 
Working conditions on fishing vessels can be dangerous and extremely difficult whether the 
catch is for export or whether the fishing is undertaken within traditional, small-scale fishing. 
Yet, there are some differences. Where fishers work on vessels owned by exporting 
companies, captains are under immense pressure from companies to ensure that they 
maximise the catch landed. This means maximising the work effort: 
The captains are responsible for the work environment. But they also receive immense 
pressure from the company. Say he is given a quota of eighty tonnes—but over a year, 
he only gets fifty. He still needs to find that extra thirty tonnes. 
company representative, Ambon (November 2018) 
According to interviewees, one way that companies and captains do this is through the use of 
calo, not just to recruit and management payments for fishers, but also to enforce compliance. 
Calo are also involved in enforcing compliance among crews perceived by captains (or 
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companies) not to be working hard enough or who want to leave in advance of their contract 
ending. This is a form of pressure to enable greater exploitation of individual workers as well 
as disciplining of the crew more generally via an extreme 24/7 work ethic: 
The biggest one is Balinese, but the underlings are usually from other places. They 
tend to be quite close too—usually related through marriage. Sometimes if a distant 
relative is unemployed, they’ll call them up to be a field coordinator or to ‘instruct’ 
the lazier ABK [fisher]. The collecting division is where most of the ‘punchers’ are. 
Even before the vessel has properly docked, they’ll be asking the ones who call sick, 
‘What’s made you sick?!’ They’ll take him to a doctor—if the doctor says the ABK 
isn’t sick, the ABK will be taken to the office and beaten. 
fisher interviewed Benoa (June 2018) 
Moreover, this research found multiple incidences of where fishers’ identity cards were 
retained by vessel captains to ensure that crews remain with the ship until the catch is landed 
and sold and kas bons are repaid. If catch sales do not cover the amount, then the fishers 
remain in debt and their ID is retained. This type of ‘enforced compliance’ is a clear indicator 
of forced labour (ILO 2017): 
I just would like to say, don’t just talk about slavery in abroad. In domestic vessels, 
there are many ABK fishers exploited. 
representative from fishermen’s association, NG1 (April 2018) 
Interviewees understood the purpose of the retention of their ID card to be about guaranteeing 
that they would stay with the vessel. Interviewees spoke about having to return to sea with 
the same company, sometimes multiple times, to work off accrued debts. When their debt is 
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not paid off, this means that they are unable to leave the vessel as they are not able to afford 
to go home: 
This is also a loan so I keep changing, but my ID card is being held. … yes 
detained. … Yes, guarantee that I won’t change anytime. … It's hard. 
fisher, Bitung (December 2018) 
The retention of identity documents to enforce compliance or to tie a worker to her or his 
place of employment is usually associated with migrant workforces. For instance, in 
Thailand, as in other countries, where migrant fishers are engaged, the confiscation of 
identity cards to retain control of the crew is common (Vandergeest et al. 2017). NGO 
interviewees in this study noted that the major difference between working conditions in the 
Indonesian domestic industry and those elsewhere where a migrant workforce is involved is 
that fishers can simply leave and go home if they did not like the work—even if they would 
be out of pocket financially. However, the risk of crew leaving when the captain needs them 
to stay is not only one related to having sufficient workforce. It is also a direct financial risk 
if the company has advanced the crew kas bon. According to captains interviewed, 
companies hold them responsible for this: 
Well, [crew running away] is part of the risk. The captain needs to be held 
accountable for that. Therefore, when the crew runs away, the captain will have to 
pay … 
captain interviewed Ambon (November 2018) 
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In short, even where the fishing workforce are not migrants, to maximise profitability similar 
exploitative practices are deployed within the industry to intensify catch effort on board 
vessels while reducing the risks of fishers leaving.  
‘THE COSTS ARE OUR DEBT’: 
PAYMENT TO FISHERS IN INDONESIA 
This research found that only the fishers on the larger vessels catching for export were 
provided with a daily wage by companies, as required under Indonesian law. For the most 
part, fishers, although catching for export, are still only provided with a percentage of the 
total amount of the sale of their combined catch from their vessel, with final payment made at 
the end of the voyage. In Indonesia as elsewhere, fishers operating vessels with their families 
and neighbours share more-or-less equally in the money which is made once the fish is sold. 
Profit-share functions to ensure that families and friends operating boats together all profit 
from the joint operation: 
I met the captain … he said it was good to work here and I’d be paid by sharing 
income … it depends on the number of tuna. If we gain a lot of them, the crews can 
receive more, otherwise they’ll receive less. 
fisher interviewed in Ambon (June 2018) 
Where the catch is substantial, the profit-share amount crews receive may work out above 
what they would have received through a daily minimum wage. However, this research has 
found that at other times, what crews receive may work out as less due to deductions for kas 
bon and costs charged by calo—where one is involved—and by the captain. Costs can be 
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charged for food and cigarettes consumed on board. Fishers are typically also charged for the 
cost of the fishing nets. 
Ah, if we are lucky we receive three to four million IDR [US$20 to US$28] per month. 
Sometimes we get paid sixty thousand IDR [US$4] per day. Or sometimes it equals 
out to seventy or eighty thousand IDR [US5 to US$5.50] per day. It depends if the 
fishing is good or not. 
fisher interviewed in Tegal (January 2018) 
 
They are also paid below the minimum wage. Normally in Muara Baru they are paid 
sixty thousand IDR [US$4] per day before deductions for food and ancillary items.  
fisherman’s association representative, Jakarta (October 2018) 
The nature of fishery payment systems evidenced in this research allowed for deception at 
worst, or lack of clarity at best. Full transparency and clarity in distribution of wages was 
uncommon. Many interviewees were not sure how fair their profit-share allocation was made, 
vis-à-vis other crew members on board who may be closer to the captain. Fishers also only 
know how much they will receive when they are told by the captain—or the calo—at the end 
of the voyage. They are aware that what they think may be the price of the catch when they 
set out, and therefore what they might expect to earn, may not be the actual price when they 
get to port. This means that fishers are not able to plan for the amounts they will receive.  
It doesn’t matter whether the fish are fresh or frozen since we always hand over the 
catch to the company. All the payment [for the fish] are done to the company directly. 
As I said, the company has many boats. So, they usually collect and weigh the catch at 
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the port and take the catch directly to the company [factory]. They will later pay 
us. … If we unload them in the morning, we will receive the salary at night.  
fisher, interviewed Bitung (December 2018) 
Where interviewees did not know or did not like the captain, they were more likely to be 
suspicious that they had been ‘cheated’ out of their share. Interviewed crews and captains 
also alleged that sometimes the companies tricked them out of their share, deceiving them 
about the price which they have managed to obtain for the fish. Many companies were 
alleged to only provide a verbal statement of what they had managed to sell the fish for: 
The trusted companies … always print the calculation as a proof. On the contrary, 
other companies are not do the same, they wouldn’t give the details like ours did, they 
just informed us verbally. This makes us question the honesty of the company because 
of the possibility of manipulation. 
captain interviewed Benoa, (December 2018) 
Even where companies do not deliberately deceive, captains and crews were aware that they 
receive only a tiny proportion of the actual worth of their catch on the global market. The 
percentage which the company takes from the sales of the total catch was reported by 
interviewees to vary from company to company: 
We divided it by four with the company. For example, if we get one million IDR 
[US$70], 750,000 IDR [US$52] goes to the companies and 250,000 IDR [US$17] 
goes to us. 
captain, interviewed Benoa (November 2018) 
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Companies also make deductions from the percentage which is allocated for the captain and 
his crews for the cost of supplies which they have paid for the voyage. Although the 
companies own the vessels, the captain and crew are responsible for paying for the fuel, sails, 
fishing nets, and food supplies used during the voyage. As captain and crew do not have 
access to sufficient money to pay for their own supplies, the company advances them credit 
to cover the cost, which is then deducted from the profit-share. As with the kas bon and 
profit-share payment to crews, this is also an inherent way in which traditional small-scale 
fishing operates, but which has been adopted by the large, immensely profitable, companies 
that trade globally. Even though they are in effect employees of the company, captains and 
their crews are typically jointly responsible for the operational costs of the boats:  
It’s hard if the fish is out of stock. So sometimes the debt could reach 30 million. So 
we have to get the results up to 30 million to cover the costs. Because the costs are 
our debt. For example, we can get around 50 million, but the cost supplies need to be 
paid, so we add to it. For example, the debt will be 45 million. If the boss is 
understanding, he doesn’t cut it all by once. He would cut it partly, sometimes [by] 5 
million or 10 million. But if the boss is not understanding he would cut all at once. 
fisher, interviewed Bitung (December 2018) 
Whilst not guaranteeing a minimum wage, the profit-share system means that crews also 
share the risk of not catching any fish, or something going wrong during the voyage. For 
example, this fisher did not receive a salary for three months because on-board storage 
facilities had broken spoiling the catch: 
A couple months ago, my salary was ‘burnt’ because the freezer was broken. So we 
didn’t receive any salary [for] three months. They only gave us IDR 500.000 [US$35] 
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as ‘pocket money’, but what could you really buy with that money? That’s why I was 
willing to be interviewed by you. I really hope that my experience won’t be inherited 
to the younger generation. 
fisher interviewed Ambon (November 2018) 
Overall, due to the nature of the profit-share system, interviewees referred to fishing as being 
a ‘gamble’ in which they did not know whether they could earn enough to support themselves 
or their families. While they could potentially earn more than working ‘on land’ in 
occupations such as construction, there was no certainty about this: 
If my children are married, they are not invited to the sea. I forbid, why, because I am 
already a fisherman. If you can get 10,000 IDR [US$0.70] at sea, it is better to get 
1,000 IDR [US$0.07] on land. So, I want to have no children who become fishermen. 
Because it's enough their father is a fisherman. The risk is rather heavy. 
older fisher interviewed in Tegal (January 2018) 
In commercial fishing as in most sectors, labour costs are the highest cost of production and 
hence where companies try to reduce costs to maximise profits (Tickler et al. 2018). Prior 
research has shown how vessel owners reduce expenditure on labour through non-compliance 
with labour and safety standards, withholding pay and hiring migrant fishers who can be 
persuaded to work for less than the average wage (Agnew & Barnes 2004, Tickler et al. 
2018). Or they may simply not pay the crew at all, as has often been the case in the Thai and 
Taiwanese industries (Greenpeace 2018, Vandergeest et al. 2017). This research additionally 
shows that informal traditional and small-scale fishing payment practices have been co-opted 
by the global industry to maximise company profitability. Cost-and-profit-sharing allows 
vessel owners to share the costs and the risks with their crew, despite the fact that they do not 
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hold any ownership or decision-making power, as traditional kin do. Nor do the fishers 
equally share in the profits, if at all. It is the crews rather than the companies who are bearing 
the risks of the unreliable nature of fishing and unproductive and unsafe fishing trips. If crews 
do not catch anything, they do not make any money while still being responsible for repaying 
the cost of the fishing trip. As the data show, repaying the kas bon and the cost of vessel 
supplies means fishers make little, and sometimes no, money from the trip, ensuring that they 
have to make repeated voyages in what might be termed ‘cycles of debt repayment’. Such 
debts provide an opportunity for the continued exploitation and extortion of money from 
crews as well as ensuring that they do not ‘capture the gains’ from the profits generated.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study has presented the first in-depth empirical research into the working conditions of 
fishers in Indonesia’s export industry. We found conditions to be generally poor, with fishers 
earning little or no money in comparison to the profits made by the global companies. 
Further, fishers are risking their health and sometimes their lives, often for little reward. This 
is not especially unusual as fishing as an occupation—whether practised sustainably or in the 
commercial sector—is known worldwide to be difficult and dangerous while generally only 
supporting a hand-to-mouth existence (Packard Foundation 2018). Simply put, fishing does 
not pay. As fish stocks are decimated or even obliterated, fishing has become an ever tougher 
occupation (FAO 2018). This research has shared two significant findings, which indicate 
that the global trade is finding new ways to further reduce labour costs to maximise or retain 
profitability.  
Firstly, our research challenges assumptions—within the literature as well as of international 
companies and policy makers—that the labour risks to fishers are primarily or even solely 
associated with their migrant status (Vandergeest et al. 2017). Intermediaries—in this case, 
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calo—are utilised by vessel owners and captains to find and mobilise fishers within Indonesia 
for the some of the same reasons that they are used elsewhere to recruit international 
migrants. Namely, when no local workforce exists, or at least who are willing to work in the 
conditions that fishers do for the little money that they do (Jones 2014). For example, 
intermediaries recruit fishers from poorer parts of Indonesia (e.g. North Central Java) to work 
on vessels operating out of Benoa (Bali), one of the richest parts of Indonesia. Without 
intermediaries fulfilling this role, it is likely that captains and vessel owners would have to 
offer better quality work and higher pay to attract fishers locally. Calo are a way for 
companies—through vessel captains—to reduce the costs of recruitment and of employment. 
Although acting for a fee, intermediaries are nevertheless deeply embedded in the social 
relationships inherent in fishing communities in Indonesia, as has been found elsewhere.  
Secondly, this research has affirmed and advanced our knowledge of how poor working 
conditions, including forced labour and trafficking situations, in fishing in low-income 
countries are used to maximise the profitability of the global industry (e.g. Duong 2018, 
Tickler et al. 2018). Our research in Indonesia has found that informal working practices 
which are inherent to traditional, small-scale fishing are co-opted by companies to reduce 
labour costs. These include how fishers are paid (kas bon), the lack of formal working 
contracts, and payment through profit-share. Companies profit from their global reach, 
technological advancement, and low labour costs, which rely on these informal employment 
practices. However, the inherent social protective factors assumed to exist in the traditional, 
artisanal environment do not extend to domestic migrants hired, often through middlemen, 
from elsewhere in Indonesia. Fishers continue to bear the costs and risks of fishing, even 
where they are employees of companies.  
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Our research has implications both for companies sourcing from Indonesia as well as for 
governments of importing countries. International brand companies and retail sourcing teams 
are facing increasing pressure to demonstrate that their businesses source from suppliers with 
internationally acceptable working conditions. The Modern Slavery Act and other due 
diligence legislation require companies to prioritise identifying forced labour and trafficking 
within their supply chains. In purchasing seafood from Indonesia, often with little 
information gathered, global retailers and buyers face the challenge of determining levels of 
legal and reputational risk associated with these exploitative conditions. We conclude that to 
date global retailers and buyers are not properly assessing risk in purchasing from Indonesia, 
as assumptions are made that, because no migrant fishers are present in Indonesia, the same 
risks which are present in Thailand are not present in Indonesia. Our research findings 
challenge the assumptions underpinning these current risk-based approaches. We argue that a 
narrow focus on modern slavery risks inadequate or even counterproductive policy responses. 
Rather, we counter that an understanding of the broader spectrum of exploitative labour 
hiring and employment practices, which fall short of the definition of modern slavery and 
which are deliberate profit-maximisation strategies by the companies, are fundamentally 
necessary. This research highlights that, without the structural and system-wide forced labour 
conditions that might encourage companies to take action, risks can still be present in 
industries and in places where they might not be immediately evident.  
Our research findings also challenge the main premise underlying national due diligence 
legislation. That is to say, that forced labour conditions are a result of unscrupulous actors 
who can, through careful action, in particular responsible sourcing, be rooted out by 
compliant international companies. We have shown that poor working conditions—including 
where these extend to extortion and forced labour conditions—are systemic to this industry. 
Overall, fishers and their families are living ‘hand to mouth’ and see few viable alternatives 
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‘on land’. It is evident that companies selling seafood to international markets capitalise on 
such pervasive ‘forms of informality’ in order to maximise labour flexibility and capital 
profitability. Yet, the Modern Slavery Act does not require companies to ensure that workers, 
in this case fishers, at the very end of supply chains capture the gains from being in the global 
economy. What moral and ethical responsibilities do companies have to ensure that those 
fishers, and their families, at the end of their supply chains, who bear the daily risks to their 
lives and to their livelihoods, take an equitable share in the valuable profits of the global 
seafood industry? These are all matters that the current research has raised and presents for 
further critical discussion by those stakeholders with interests in the Indonesian fishing 
industry. 
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